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1962/11/08

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Drafted by A. Akalovsky

Nov. 8, 1962
 5 to 8:20 PM
 Soviet Mission, NY

SUBJECT: CUBA

PARTICIPANTS: US - Ambassador Stevenson
 Mr. McClellan
 Amb. Yoss
 A. Akalovsky

Ex. A - Caption removed: Mr. Kuznetsov
Ex. B - Transfer with ad Mr. Mendalevich
Ex. C - Caption and custody retained by S. S.

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Mr. Kuznetsov said he had heard there was some confusion with regard to the route the Soviet ships were taking on their way from Cuba to the Soviet Union.

Mr. McClellan remarked that we had just received word about one Soviet ship, the Volgodes, which had been met by a US vessel and asked to uncover some of the missiles, but the master of the ship refused to do so. However, our vessel had seen seven objects which could have been missiles.

Mr. Kuznetsov referred to the query by the US Delegation concerning the fact that the Soviet ships were going not via the Straits of Florida but via the Bahamas Straits. He said he wished to draw the attention to the fact that all ships going from Havana must go at least part of the way through the Straits of Florida and could then take the Bahama Straits, and all Soviet ships were taking that route. He wanted this information to be passed on to appropriate US authorities. The Soviet Delegation was prepared to resolve these practical problems expeditiously and if it had any further information it would be passed on promptly to the US Delegation. In any event, in this particular case there had been a pure misunderstanding.



~~SECRET - EMBASSY~~

Mr. Khrushchev continued that today he wished to discuss one particular issue, namely, that of the ~~guarantees~~ guarantees to Cuba with regard to measures which should be taken in accordance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement so as to ensure that everything would be done to prevent recurrence of what had taken place in that area. He wished to recall that the USSR's commitment was to dismantle and remove rockets, or what the US called offensive armaments. He could state that this commitment had been fulfilled in accordance with Mr. Khrushchev's statement. All missiles had been loaded on ships, and while there was no information whether all ships had left Havana, according to the plan, they were supposed to leave ~~yesterday~~ yesterday. Also, Soviet ships with missiles on deck could be verified by US vessels to see that missiles were really there and that the numbers of missiles were correct. In addition, launching pads had been completely put out of commission. Thus, the USSR believed that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned all obstacles which in US view had been preventing the settlement of the crisis had been removed, and that all conditions ^{now} had/been ~~now~~ created for the settlement of all other questions which ^{had} ~~had~~ not yet been discussed in detail. The USSR believed that the basic problem ^{now} was to have the commitments contained in the President's letter fulfilled as soon as possible so that both sides could report to the Security Council about the completion of ~~negotiations~~ negotiations and settle this problem. The USSR understood that the US Government and the President proceeded from the premise that such commitments would be undertaken by the US. The Soviet Delegation wished to ask today for US ~~on~~ views concerning the actual implementation of the President's statement. As to the substance of these commitments, the USSR believed that in order to give real guarantees to Cuba that there would be no danger to its security and integrity/ ^{and} that there would be no interference in Cuba's internal affairs, and in order to ensure a tranquil situation

~~SECRET - EMBASSY~~

in the Caribbean and throughout the world to prevent recurrence of recent events, the US commitments should include the following: 1

1. Not to invade Cuba with ~~US~~ ^{US} ~~armed~~ ^{armed} forces and not to violate in any way the integrity of Cuba's territory, territorial waters, and air space;
2. Not to make US territory available to anyone for underground activities aimed at invading Cuba, and to refuse to support or encourage anyone planning aggression against Cuba from US territory or from the territories ~~territories~~ of the states neighboring on Cuba;
3. In accordance with the UN Charter, not to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and ~~and~~ to refrain from supporting or encouraging ~~any~~ any group, organization or individual planning such activities either from US territory or from the territories of other states;
4. Not to interfere with the free exercise of trade and economic relations between Cuba and other states and to rescind all measures aimed at limiting those relations;
5. To enter in negotiations with Cuba for the purpose of normalizing relations with that country, including negotiations on the restoration of Cuban rights to its territory in Guantanamo;
6. To appeal to all states in the Western Hemisphere to refrain from supporting or encouraging any activities directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or independence of Cuba, and not to allow such activities by any group, or organization, or individual from their territory; and
7. To state that all contracting parties, i.e. the US, the USSR and ~~and~~ Cuba, agree to accept the U Thant plan for the establishment of a UN

presence in the Caribbean area by instituting UN observation posts to observe the fulfillment by the parties of their obligations.

The USSR believed that implementation of such steps would be a serious guarantee and would give hope to the Cuban and other peoples that a good deal of work had been done to create a better atmosphere and to facilitate promote the cause of peace. It was unnecessary to repeat that a settlement of this problem would be a great contribution to a healthier atmosphere in the Caribbean area and throughout the world and would facilitate solution of other international problems awaiting their settlement. It was these matters that the Soviet Delegation wished to discuss today.

Ambassador Stevenson ^{said} that first of all he wished to make comment on Mr. Kuznetsov's statement that the USSR had fulfilled its obligations under the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement by dismantling the launching pads and shipping the missiles. As he had stated earlier, this was not in accord with our understanding, because there were still unresolved issues, namely, those of removing the IL-28 aircraft, of instituting some verification of the removal of warheads, and of establishing some element of ground inspection in a final arrangement. It was only after these issues were resolved that we could agree that the contract had been fulfilled. As we had said before, we were under the impression that the procedure contemplated by the parties and the Secretary General was that after participation by both sides of the completion of the agreement to the Security Council, the US would then make ~~make~~ its ~~promise~~ guarantee in accordance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. Another problem, which was also referred to in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, was that of establishing suitable safeguards to halt possible future introduction of such weapons in Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson continued that he had no objection to discussing guarantees, but noted that until some agreement was reached on what constituted compliance with the understanding we believed any discussion of ~~guarantees~~ guarantees would be premature. Furthermore, it would be very difficult for him to respond now, point by point, to the suggestions just made concerning the content of the guarantees. He wondered whether it might not be useful if Mr. Kuznetsov were to give him a copy of the points he had enumerated. He did not believe that the two sides were far apart with regard to the spirit of the guarantees, but thought ~~them~~ they might be far apart with regard to language. ~~He~~ In this connection, he wished to note that ~~Mr. Kuznetsov's~~ ^{Mr. Khrushchev's} letter said the ~~US~~ would declare that it would not invade Cuba and would not support forces that might contemplate such an invasion; the President's letter said we would give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and that he was confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

Mr. McCloy commented that he did not recognize in Mr. Kuznetsov's language any of the President's language but he did recognize a good deal of Castro's language, which was not incorporated in the President's message by any stretch of imagination.

Ambassador Stevenson said that we believed there were two aspects to the guarantees: (1) ~~US~~ guarantees about non-invasion; and (2) suitable guarantees by the ~~USSR~~, which might be worked out later, that such weapons would not be re-introduced in Cuba.

Mr. McCloy referred to Ambassador Stevenson's remark concerning the failure to resolve the IL-28 problem and the issue of warheads and said that he was interested in Mr. Kuznetsov's statement about the so-called vulnerable character of the IL-28 bombers. He said he had a chart, which he would be happy to give to Mr. Kuznetsov, which showed how much those aircraft could be

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employed beyond coastal defense. He pointed out that the range of the IL-28 was 750 miles and that therefore the entire industrial complex in the Southeast of the United States, as well as all of Central America were within that range. Furthermore, since the IL-28 was a jet bomber designed to carry nuclear weapons it could inflict great damage as far away as New York, Boston, Ottawa, Quebec, Chicago, St. Paul, Denver, all of Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, and British Guiana, by not returning to Cuba and landing either in the north or in the south. Surely, it would be a small loss to lose a few planes or pilots if one wished to engage in such an operation. Thus it was quite clear that one could not describe the IL-28 as a coastal defense aircraft, and any such claim had to be taken with a big grain of salt. As to Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that the IL-28 was 15 years old, that argument was not convincing either because ^{the US} had 15-year old planes which could still carry lethal weapons.

today
Mr. Kuznetsov responded that he still thought that the two delegations should exchange views in greater detail on the questions relating to ensuring a situation of peace and security for Cuba and the Caribbean area and preventing any recurrence of the crisis. Therefore, he did not intend to deal with the points raised by Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy. The USSR firmly believed that what it had done in implementing the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement was quite sufficient for the two sides to be able immediately to deal with the development of measures providing guarantees to Cuba and giving assurances to all the peoples in the Caribbean area. However, since Messrs Stevenson and McCloy had touched upon some questions which had been discussed earlier, he wished to make a brief comment. As to the IL-28 aircraft, the USSR had stated its views on that point. He now wished to draw attention to the fact that

to begin a discussion of what was offensive or defensive would mean engaging in a slippery discussion; in any event, the USSR could not accept the US view as to what was offensive and what defensive. At the last meeting, he had cited such an authority as Mr. McNamara, and even he admitted that any weapon could be regarded either as offensive or defensive. The USSR believed that any state had the right to be concerned with its security and to decide for itself what arms were required for its defenses. The USSR did not wish to be drawn into a discussion of what the Cuban government regarded as offensive or defensive; such a discussion could not bring us closer to a solution of the problem at hand, because the two sides had different views on this point. In his letter, the President had recognized the right of any state to arm itself for defensive purposes, and this applied to Cuba as well. The USSR had not heard any objection by the US to this principle so far, and if the US had changed its view it should say so. As to what defensive means were needed by Cuba, the USSR was not authorized to speak for Cuba; it was not authorized to be the voice of another sovereign state or act on its behalf. As far as the substance of the matter was concerned, the Soviet Delegation had convincingly proved in the course of earlier discussions that the US demand with regard to the IL-28 aircraft went beyond the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Mr. Khrushchev said he wished to appeal once again that the framework of the agreement of letters be exceeded and that the area of disagreement should not be artificially enlarged. In any event, he could not say anything new now concerning the IL-28 issue. The USSR had removed what the US considered to be offensive weapons and thus had fulfilled its commitment. It was now for the US to take appropriate steps. The USSR had fulfilled its commitments; it had removed its missiles and had provided for verification by agreeing

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that the US could ascertain that fact.

Turning to the question of warheads, Mr. Kuznetsov said this matter had been discussed in detail at the last meeting. He did not wish to dwell on it, but wished to stress that the US approach to this question was aimed at complicating the problem and creating artificial difficulties. He wished to state that the ~~removal~~^{intend} of missiles, which the US called offensive weapons, meant that no warheads related to ~~missile~~ such weapons would remain on Cuban soil. Therefore, any discussion about some verification was pointless ~~and~~ could only protract the problem and divert our attention. A situation where rockets had been removed and warheads remained was absurd. Warheads were no hand grenades, and even for hand grenades there were some operating manuals. Obviously warheads could not be used without missiles. Ambassador Stevenson had said that missiles without warheads could not be called weapons, but by the same token warheads without missiles were of no value either and could not be used. Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to stress another point in order to make a ~~further~~^{further} step toward the solution of the problem and to clarify the situation. He said he wished to state that warheads had been loaded and removed as soon as the decision to remove missiles had been adopted. As to missiles, they were being removed on the nine ships the list of which had been furnished by the US delegation.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that he now wished to go back to the questions he had raised in his initial remarks. First of all, he wanted to stress again that the US should pay attention to this problem also. So far, the USSR had observed a lack of interest for this question on the part of the United States; indeed, the US had tried to avoid the subject. Mr. McClellan had referred to Castro's language. Perhaps Castro's language was undesirable to the US, but it did reflect the legitimate demands of the Cuban people. The question was not one

of what label the US attached to what the USSR had said, but of the substance of the matter. The USSR's statement reflected the substance of Mr. Khrushchev's letter and of what flowed from the President's letter. In Mr. Khrushchev's October 27 letter, which the President regarded as the basis for the agreement, the US would declare that it was stated that "the USA, motivated by the inviolability of Cuba's frontiers and sovereignty, undertakes not to interfere in its internal affairs, itself not to invade Cuba or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate perpetrating aggression against Cuba, both from the territory of the USA and from the territory of other neighboring states of Cuba." He wondered what Mr. McNamara thought was unacceptable ^{here} ~~statement~~. It was necessary to know this because if the USSR heard the US views on this point it would obtain a ^{clearer} ~~clear~~ picture of the situation. In any event, what the Soviet views expressed earlier were in accord with the agreement and now it was important to discuss the substance of the matter. In this connection, he wished to say to Mr. Stevenson that while the Soviet Delegation had expressed some views on this matter, the US had a better idea of how this document should be worded. Therefore, it would be useful if the US developed such a document and gave it to the Soviet Delegation so that we ~~and/or could see where we stood with regard to this problem~~. When it was a matter of ~~commitment~~ ^{regard} ~~of the other side~~, it was that side that should develop the language. If the USSR ~~was to~~ ^{was to} work out such document, the US might ~~impose~~ ^{impose} that as interference in its affairs, as a Diktat, as a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to impose something on the US. The USSR sought to discuss such a document and the solution of this problem in the spirit of mutual ~~agreement~~ ^{understanding}; therefore, it would appreciate receiving a draft of this document at an early date.

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Referring to the question of Soviet guarantees for the future, Mr. Kuznetsov said that the last point he had mentioned in his initial remarks covered this matter, because ^{UN} UN presence would not only provide for measures ensuring that there would be no threat to Cuba, but Cuba would also undertake certain commitments not to become a threat to the US. The USSR believed that Cuba was no threat even now, but if the US desired such guarantees, the USSR thought that Cuba should enter into some commitments. However, the US would have to discuss this matter with Cuba. He said he wished to note that the U Thant proposal for a UN presence provided for verification of obligations undertaken by all parties.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that as to Soviet suggestions, ~~the USSR did not~~ believe that everything would be acceptable to the US but noted with satisfaction Ambassador Stevenson's remark that the two sides were not far apart with regard to the spirit of giving the guarantees. He thought that the two sides had already done a great deal together; many problems had already been resolved and if the two sides continued in the same spirit, this matter could be resolved too. If the ^{approaches} ~~approach~~ of the two sides was more or less the same, it ~~was~~ should not be difficult to develop an appropriate ~~agreement~~.

~~Mr. Kuznetsov~~ who had been absent from the room for quite a while, returned and said that he had a practical question to raise. He said he had just talked to Moscow on the phone and been informed that the interpretation of the course of Soviet ships as put forward by the Soviet Delegation was correct. Apparently there had been some lack of clarity in the language of previous communications with regard to the Straits of Florida and the further ~~future~~ ^{future} itinerary of Soviet ships. In addition, he had been given the exact

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revealed

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War

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

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positions of the Soviet ships carrying missiles and the numbers of missiles on board each of these ships. (He gave us a paper containing that information.) Finally, he had been told that one ship had left *Casilda*, on the southern shores of Cuba, and was taking the course via the Windward Channel. Mr. Kerin also said that he had informed Moscow about Mr. McClellan's remarks & that there had been refusal to uncover missiles. Moscow did not know about the incident, but believed that perhaps the masters had understood instructions to mean that missiles should be uncovered only if helicopters were used by the US. Incidentally, Moscow had received information that US helicopters were already flying over some Soviet ships.

Ambassador Stevenson observed that Mr. Kuznetsov's last remarks referred to several questions: (a) bombers, (b) warheads, (c) gun guarantees. With regard to bombers, we had discussed this question in great detail the other night. He could only repeat what he had said before, i.e., that the US classed ~~some~~ the IL-28 aircraft as offensive weapons. He had given five citations to prove that the US had always regarded these aircraft as belonging ^{to} the category of offensive weapons, beginning with a quotation from the President's October 22 speech and ending with the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters of agreement. ~~Since, the US position~~ had been made manifestly clear from the very start. ~~Ambassador Stevenson~~ said that he also wished to comment on Mr. Kuznetsov's remark concerning ~~the~~ right to weapons. He said he wished to state that the question was not of Cuba but that of compliance with the agreement. Not to remove the IL-28 aircraft, was not ~~to~~ to comply with the agreement.

Turning to warheads, Ambassador Stevenson ~~said~~ said that the US did not wish to delay agreement by raising that ~~point~~ point; in fact, we ^{had} wanted to conclude a agreement 10 days ago. It was the Soviet Union which delayed agreement by attempting to exclude the IL-28 aircraft, which the US ^{had} regarded as offensive

from the very outset. He said himself he also differed with Mr. Kuznetsov that warheads were of no value without rockets; He wished to point out that warheads, with some modification or perhaps even without any modification, could be dropped from airplanes. Mr. Kuznetsov had said that warheads had already been removed - how did we know? Originally the USSR had agreed to ground inspection. It could not perform on this point, so the US had agreed to inspection at sea -- so why could not such inspection be applied to warheads as well, which were a component of rockets. Ambassador Stevenson stressed that he wished the talks to get down to the simple facts ^{of} the situation. Perhaps as a result of that some conclusion could be reached why the USSR ~~insisted~~ ^{insists} ~~persist~~ in ~~not~~ removing weapons and not agreeing on some verification of warheads.

Ambassador Stevenson then referred to Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that ^{the} US had shown no interest in and had avoided the question of guarantees. He said he believed the US had made its position crystal-clear, and that position was stated in the President's letter. He again quoted the pertinent passages from Mr. Khrushchev's and the President's letters, and noted that in his October 26th letter Mr. Khrushchev said "I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message on October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, etc." He did not think that much could be discussed about ~~guarantees~~. That question had been answered a long time ago. Mr. Kuznetsov wanted to speak, but the draft was in the President's October 27 letter, and it spoke for itself. In any event, Ambassador Stevenson stressed, he believed that before one could speak ^{of} ~~on~~ what should be done upon completion of the transaction, agreement should be reached on the transaction itself. Mr. Kuznetsov had referred to Cuban guarantees to the United States, but he was most ambiguous with regard to guarantees against ^{the} ~~the~~ introduction by the USSR of weapons in the future, ~~and about the same guarantees in this respect.~~

Mr. McNamara observed that he was not clear as to what Mr. Kuznetsov had meant in speaking about UN presence and wondered whether Mr. Kuznetsov could perhaps clarify. He then said he had also noticed that Mr. Kuznetsov had chosen his words very carefully when he ~~referred~~ said that warheads had been removed. Mr. Kuznetsov seemed to exclude those warheads not related to the weapons removed. The warheads were the most destructive part of ~~the~~ weapons systems and they could also be dropped from planes. It was the warheads that provided nuclear capability. The implication that other nuclear warheads remained in Cuba was extremely disquieting, and perhaps the USSR could give ~~assurance~~ that all nuclear warheads had been removed.

Mr. Kuznetsov recalled Ambassador Stevenson's reference to ~~the letters and~~ some other documents to prove that the IL-28 aircraft had always been regarded by the US as offensive weapons, and said that he wished to repeat that Ambassador Stevenson's letters and the other documents he had referred to were unilateral documents; ~~that~~ these documents unilaterally listed so-called offensive weapons but they could not be recognised as being in accord with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. Both sides must proceed from the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters which formed the basis for agreement, rather than from what had been said ~~before~~ ~~in the course of the exchange of letters~~ in the course of the exchange of letters before or after the exchange of letters. ~~Mr. Ambassador Stevenson~~ If Ambassador Stevenson continued to refer to documents and letters other than the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters of October 27 and 28, then he could say that there were some letters from Mr. Khrushchev in which some other questions had been ~~raised~~ raised too, but the USSR was not raising them. If we were not to engage in a discussion of these questions which had been raised in the course of the exchange, then there would be no progress, we would not be able to reach agreement, and we would go back to the situation of crisis. Both sides should handle with great care what had been agreed as basis for these deliberations.

[REDACTED]

Regarding the warheads, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to state most emphatically that Mr. McCloy's interpretation of his remarks was incorrect. Mr. McCloy apparently wished to ascribe to the USSR something it had not said, and this was most disconcerting. For the sake of clarity, Mr. Kuznetsov said, he wished to repeat what he had said, namely, that removal from Cuba of missiles which the US regarded as offensive weapons meant that no warheads relating to those weapons would remain in Cuba. Since this was so, any discussion about verification was now pointless. When Mr. McCloy implied that something else might be present in Cuba, that was incorrect. He also wished to stress that warheads had been loaded on ships and removed as soon as the decision had been adopted to remove the so-called offensive missiles. Therefore, he wanted to repeat that any discussion of control would be pointless. The USSR could only regard such discussions as an attempt to prevent the normalization of the situation and to delay the settlement of the problem by creating new obstacles in the way of a possible agreement.

Recalling Amb. Stevenson's remark that the USSR could not perform with respect to ground inspection, Mr. Kuznetsov said that the USSR, in response to a US suggestion, had made it possible for the US to obtain assurances with regard to the removal of all rockets. Mr. Stevenson was aware of the situation with respect to ground inspection, and Mr. Khrushchev's letter meant, of course, that the inspection would be subject to consent from the Cuban Government.

Mr. Kuznetsov then said that he wished to come back to the question he intended to discuss today and which the US side was trying to avoid. It appeared that this question was of no interest to the US. Mr. Stevenson had said that

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the only guarantee which was still outstanding was the Soviet Union's guarantee not to reintroduce rockets in Cuba. The USSR had already considered this question and it had been referred to in Mr. Khrushchev's letter. The USSR had given assurances and had taken certain steps. However, if one traced down the main source of conflict, one would see that it was not the USSR but the US that had been responsible for what had happened in Cuba. The small country of Cuba ~~xxxx~~ threatened by a big country which had wanted to put an end to the regime ^{how} ~~not~~ ^{Cuban} prevailing in Cuba and to prevent the/people from living as they pleased. One might ask why the USSR desired clear-cut assurances from the US. The reason for that was ^{that} the President had said that US assurances would be given, but since then a number of statements had been made that there would be no assurances because the US could not agree with the situation now obtaining in Cuba. In this connection, he wished to draw attention to Mr. Theodore Sorenson's November 4 statement on TV, in which he had said that the US could not and would not give assurances with regard to non-invasion until it was satisfied that some agreement satisfactory to it was reached. The Soviet Union believed that such agreement already existed and was contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters. At any rate, in view of the fact that views like Mr. Sorenson's were being promoted in the US, the USSR believed it necessary to discuss the question of US guarantees to Cuba. The USSR had dismantled its missiles in Cuba, but did the US intend to give clear, unambiguous assurances which would leave no doubt in the minds of the Cuban and other peoples of the world that there would be no invasion and no support of invasion by others? ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ In his October 28 letter, the President had said that "I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply ^{of} today

as first undertakings as part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. In the President's October 27 letter there was a statement with regard to commitments about non-invasion, but now there was no confidence that the US was prepared to give such guarantees. The current discussions only reinforced this doubt.

Mr. Kuznetsov then quoted at length from Borticos' October 8 speech at the UN, the TIME magazine ^{story} April 28, 1961 ~~story~~ about the Bay of Pigs episode, and the September 9, 1962 Joint Resolution of Congress, saying that all ~~these statements~~ ^{this} proved US aggressive intentions against Cuba. It was for this reason that the USSR considered it impossible to ignore the very important question of ~~commitments~~ ^{guarantees} and assurances to be given to Cuba. It was for this reason that the USSR believed it important to have clear-cut assurances by the US with regard to non-interference and non-intervention in Cuba. It was important to have a clear answer whether the US was prepared to give such assurances. From the discussion Mr. Stevenson had had with Mr. Mikoyan, the USSR had gained the impression that the US was prepared to give guarantees and to present them to the Security Council. However, it appeared that the matter had not progressed since then and the whole question was now in doubt.

As to Mr. McNamara's question with regard to U Thant's proposal for a UN presence in the Caribbean area, U Thant had probably stated his views to the US, but he had told the USSR, that teams of UN observers would be formed and stationed located in the US and some Latin American countries related to this problem, including Cuba. Of course, the stationing of such teams would be subject to consent on the part of the respective governments. The function of the teams would be to observe compliance by the parties with the obligations undertaken.

Mr. Kuznetsov concluded that he realized he had taken much time, but then this problem was a large one. He would be appreciate an answer from the US, but if the US Delegation was not prepared to give it now, perhaps it could do so later, if possible tomorrow. In any event, there should be no long delay.

Amb. Stevenson noted the lateness of the hour and said he wished to make a brief reply. Mr. Kuznetsov had said that the documents the US Delegation had cited in establishing the inclusion of bombers in the category of offensive weapons were unilateral in character, and that the understanding should be based on the exchange of letters. He said that he agreed with the ~~former~~ statement and pointed out that the President's October 27 letter referred to "all weapons systems capable of offensive ~~use~~ use," and Mr. Khrushchev's reply did not object to that reference. Mr. Kuznetsov ~~had~~ said that statements which had been used in polemics were not part of the agreement, but he wished to remind Mr. Kuznetsov that he had quoted from the President's and his own statements in order to establish the fact that bombers had been included in the category of offensive weapons on October 22, i.e., 10 days before his letter to Mr. Mikoyan.

Referring to Mr. Kuznetsov's statement that no warheads relating to offensive weapons remained in Cuba, Amb. Stevenson pointed out that according to ^{the} Soviet position ~~missiles~~ ^{the only offensive weapons} were the only offensive weapons. He wondered ~~what~~ what the ~~situation was with regard to nuclear bombs and their removal~~ ^{situation was with regard to nuclear bombs and their removal}. Mr. Kuznetsov had said that ~~any discussion~~ ^{any discussion} of verification of warheads was pointless because warheads had been removed, but this problem was no more pointless to us than the removal of missiles.

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Finally, Mr. Kuznetsov had asked whether the US would give clear-cut assurances which would leave no doubt that the US would not invade Cuba and would not support those who wished to launch an invasion, *and commented* ~~that the USSR was not confident that the US would give such guarantees.~~

Amb. Stevenson wondered why this was so. He pointed out that the President's explicit letter was ~~clear~~ on this point; the commitment was clear and it had been confirmed in the President's October 28 letter, which spoke of "firm undertakings on part of both our governments." Why then did Mr. Kuznetsov say that the Soviet Union had doubts that the US would undertake such guarantees? The guarantees would be given when conditions were met, and those conditions were contained in the President's letter which referred to the removal of "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use" under UN arrangements. The US had waived ~~its arrangements~~ to verify the removal of missiles, and it had suggested means of verifying the removal of warheads but that had apparently been rejected. Likewise, the USSR apparently had rejected the removal of the IL-28 aircraft and nuclear bombs. What more was there to say? The assurances were clear and the conditions were also clear. The trouble was that ~~as~~ the two sides were unable to agree on the terms of the transaction, and Castro's objections apparently prevented the completion of the transaction. If the USSR helped to complete the transaction by removing the IL-28 aircraft ~~and the~~ nuclear components, then the US would make the guarantees ~~as set forth in the~~ President's letter, perhaps in the Security Council ~~if that should prove the appropriate way to do it.~~

Amb. Stevenson concluded the conversation by saying that Mr. McCloy, Amb. Yost and himself would be ~~continually~~ available for further discussions if such discussions would prove fruitful.

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